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interaction between fiscal and monetary policies has not been fully explored. Our paper aims to fill 
this gap by evaluating the consequences produced by multiplicative uncertainty in such a context.  
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Nowadays one of the most important challenges for policymakers, in particular monetary 
authorities, is how to deal with uncertainty (Lane, 2003). In a public speech, Alan Greenspan (2003) 
observed that “uncertainty is not just an important feature of the monetary policy landscape; it is the 
defining characteristic of that landscape.” Central bankers face in fact a tremendous uncertainty 
about the state of the economy, its true structure and the impact policy actions have on the economy 
as “uncertainty – about the state of the economy, the economy’s structure, and the inferences that 
the public will draw from policy actions or economic developments – is a pervasive feature of 
monetary policy making,” in the words of another Fed Chairman, Ben Bernanke (2007).
1 
Bernanke’s speech also emphasizes that uncertainty may assume different forms. These can be 
summarized in model, parameter and data uncertainty.
2  
Many studies have recently revised the robustness of the optimal monetary policy prescriptions in 
the face of uncertainty. Among them some have attempted to highlight the importance of 
multiplicative or parameter uncertainty, i.e., when policymakers are uncertain about the structural 
parameters of the economy.
3 The interest on this kind of uncertainty is however old. About forty 
years ago, Brainard (1967) showed that multiplicative uncertainty affects policymakers’ behavior 
and makes them more cautious, in the sense that they react less sharply to disturbances. By 
                                                 
* The authors are grateful to G. Ciccarone, M. Marchetti, M. Manzo for useful comments on earlier drafts. 
1 Similar citations can be found in the public speeches of many other central bankers and in monetary authorities’ 
operative meetings – e.g., “as a consequence of greater uncertainty – the second feature resulting from global economic 
integration – monetary policy formulation and implementation is more challenging, complex and demanding” (Solans, 
member of the executive board of the ECB, 2000) or “participants noted the considerable uncertainty surrounding 
estimates of the output and unemployment gaps and the extent of their effects on prices.” (FOMC minutes, June 23-24, 
2009). 
2 See Dennis (2005) for a clear definition of this taxonomy.  
3 See Estrella and Mishkin (1999), Hansen and Sargent (2004), Onatski and Williams (2003), Peersman and Smets 
(1999), Svensson (1999), Rudebusch (2001, 2002), Giannoni (2002), Söderström (2002), Lawler (2002), Schellekens 
(2002), Walsh (2003), Castelnuovo and Surico (2004), Orphanides and Williams (2005), Gurkaynak et al. (2005). 4 
 
considering a linear quadratic context, Brainard (1968) shows that caution may be optimal because, 
in the presence of random multipliers, policy itself injects uncertainty into the economy. Aggressive 
policy moves which might otherwise (under certainty or certainty equivalence)
4 offset disturbances, 
excess inflation, for example, can trigger further uncertainty via policy changes. Thus, when 
policymakers are unsure of the impact of their policy it would be preferable for them to adjust 
policy more cautiously and gradually; this is in summary Brainard’s conservatism principle.
5  
Despite the increasing number of studies, the role of uncertainty in strategic contexts, in particular 
in the interactions between fiscal and monetary policies, has not been fully explored, although its 
empirical relevance has been emphasized.
6 Our paper tackles this issue by focusing on the effects of 
model uncertainty on the strategic interaction between fiscal and monetary authorities. Our aim is to 
evaluate the consequences produced by multiplicative uncertainty in a class of policy games 
recently developed by Dixit and Lambertini (2001, 2003a, 2003b) – D&L from now onward. We 
test under parameter uncertainty some of D&L’s prescriptions.  
D&L’s models are particularly attractive for our investigations as they consider both fiscal and 
monetary policies in a strategic but simplified New Keynesian framework and a non-linear structure 
for shocks on the basis of which the private sector forms its expectation. Hence they are appropriate 
to study policy interactions from our perspective.
7 In their models policymakers do however not 
face any uncertainty as they observe all the shocks. Under this assumption D&L (2003b) show that 
if fiscal and monetary authorities share identical output and inflation targets, but not necessary 
equal trade-offs between these objectives (symbiosis assumption), ideal output and inflation can be 
always achieved.
8 We instead assume that through some process of theorizing and data analysis, 
policymakers have arrived at a reference model of the economy. They want to use this model to set 
policy, but are concerned about uncertain deviations from it. In particular, similarly to Lawler 
(2006),
9 we assume uncertainty about the parameters of the monetary policy effectiveness: the 
central bank does not exactly know the value of some parameters but knows the distribution from 
which they were drawn.
10  
Our main findings are the following: D&L’s symbiosis result no longer holds under unknown 
multiplicative shocks on monetary policy effects. Monetary uncertainty is not symmetric to the 
fiscal one, as the former may induce either more or less aggressive effects on the final outcomes 
according to the kind of existing interaction between the government and the central bank. Finally 
multiplicative uncertainty implies an endogenous Phillips relationship between inflation and output. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes our benchmark model 
when shocks are observed. In section 3 we study the effects of multiplicative uncertainty on 
monetary policy effectiveness by assuming that policymakers may be not perfectly informed about 
all the shocks. A final section concludes.  
                                                 
4 In this context, it is well known that additive shocks do not affect optimal policy. 
5 This principle has been challenged by some economists. Walsh (2003), e.g., shows that it does not obtain if the 
monetary authorities put no negligible weight on interest rate stabilization. In this case the central bank needs to act 
aggressively in order to neutralize the impact of demand shocks on output. See also Giuli (2010) for the case of 
Knightian uncertainty. 
6 See e.g. Lane (2003), De Grauwe and Sénégasb (2006) and references therein. 
7 However, note that the model does not explicitly include interest rates and public debt. Thus, it does not consider 
important channels of interaction, e.g., the possibility of fiscal dominance. See e.g. Bajo-Rubio et al. (2009).  
8 D&L (2001) also discuss the different results which obtain when symbiosis does not hold. 
9 Who, however, focuses on the interaction between the central bank and the private sector (unions) under monetary 
policy uncertainty. 
10 The empirical relevance of parameter uncertainty for monetary policy has been emphasized, among others, by Sack 
(1998), Sack and Wieland (1999), Batini et al. (1999), and Tetlow (2000). 5 
 
2. The economic benchmark 
We consider the extension of D&L (2003b)
11 to multiplicative uncertainty for policymakers 
developed in Di Bartolomeo et al. (2009), where the focus is only on fiscal policy uncertainty. The 
model is described by two elements: the policymakers’ losses and the structure of the economy. We 
assume that policymakers play simultaneously (Nash equilibrium).  
The policymakers’ expected losses depend on deviations of inflation π  and real output  y  from 
some common targets, π
∗and  y
∗ (i.e., the symbiosis assumption). Formally, government’s ( G L ) 










∗∗ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎢⎥
⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
=− + − ∈ ,  (1) 
where  E  denotes the expectation operator;  G θ  and  B θ  are their marginal rates of substitution 
between inflation and real output deviations from the targets. We assume a conservative central 
banker (i.e.,  BG θ θ ≤ ) – see e.g. Rogoff (1985) and Lambertini (2004).  
The economy consists of a Lucas type supply equation and a simple demand equation: 
 
e yyb a x ππ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ = +− +  (2) 
  0 cx π επ µ = +  (3) 
where 
e π  is inflation expected by the private sector, and x and  0 π  are fiscal and monetary policy 
instruments. As usual, due to distortions in the good markets, the natural level of real output ( y ) is 
considered too low from a social point of view, i.e.  y y >
* . Real output can deviate from the 




⎝⎠ −  and of the direct effect of the 
fiscal instrument on real output which can be either positive, for Keynesian demand effects, or 
negative, for crowding out effects; the algebra of the model is however the same in the two cases. 
Both the fiscal and the monetary policy instruments affect the level of inflation (see equation (3)).
12 
Without loss of generality for our scope, we assume  0 b > ,  0 c >  and  0 a > .
13  
Our benchmark is quite standard, apart from the fact that we introduce policy uncertainty by 
assuming that policymakers can be unable to fully known the effectiveness of their instruments. We 
in fact assume unobserved shocks to fiscal and monetary policy effectiveness, i.e. 
2 1 µ µ σ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ , ∼  and 
2 1 ε ε σ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ , ∼ .
14  
By minimizing the government’s and the central bank’s losses with respect to the fiscal and 
monetary instrument, respectively, subject to equations (2) and (3), we obtain the following first 
order conditions: 
                                                 
11 We only consider the one-country version of D&L (2003b); however, our results can be easily extended to a 
monetary union (for a discussion, see Lambertini, 2004). 
12 This may be due to the fact that the central bank is, in practice, forced to accommodate fiscal expansion to some 
extent, or to a change in the equilibrium price of goods depending on the balance between the effects of fiscal policy on 
aggregate demand and on costs, produced by changes in tax distortions or in public investment. Thus c can be either 
positive or negative. 
13 See D&L (2003a, 2003b) for an extensive discussion about the model and its derivation. 
14 For similar specifications, see, among others, Letterie (1997), Pearce and Sobue (1997), Lawler (2002, 2006) and 
Schellekens (2002). 6 
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As shown by D&L (2003b), if the (multiplicative) shocks are perfectly observed by both 




The framework, however, encompasses two different cases, even under perfect information (or on 
average if shocks are considered). As the common output target is larger than the natural output and 
fiscal policy is inflationary, the fiscal attempts to increase output above its natural value will always 
produce inflation. Thus, if the inflation target is zero (or small), the expansionary fiscal policy 
( 0 x > ) must be supported by a restrictive monetary one ( 0 0 π < ) in order to achieve the common 
targets. By contrast, if the common inflation target is particularly large ( ()
c
a yy π
∗∗ >− ), the 
expansionary fiscal policy will be supported by a monetary expansion.
16 We refer to the former case 
as the deflationary monetary regime and to the latter as the inflationary one. It is worth noticing 
that, in D&L’s (2003b), monetary policy ( 0 π ) can be deflationary or inflationary, but inflation is 
always equal to π
∗.  
3. Shocks and symbiosis 
Now we focus on the case of uncertainty on monetary policy effect, while fiscal policy is assumed 
to be known with certainty, i.e.,  1 µ =  and 
2 1 ε ε σ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ , ∼ .
17 The first order conditions (4) and (5) 
become:   
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since 
22 1 E ε ε σ
⎛⎞
⎜⎟
⎝⎠ =+ .  
By solving equations (6) and (7) we obtain the optimal policy rules for the government and the 
central bank:
18 
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15 It is worth noticing that the introduction of unobserved additive shocks would not affect the optimal policies set under 
certainty (and thus average outcomes), because of the linear-quadratic nature of the game – certain equivalence would 
hold in this case. See Holly and Hughes Hallett (1989) for more details. 
16 See D&L’s (2003a, 2003b) or Di Bartolomeo et al. (2009) for more details.   
17 Fiscal policy uncertainty has been studied in Di Bartolomeo et al. (2009). 
18 Equations (8) and (9) are the reaction functions given the private sector expectations, which are already formed when 
policymakers move. We determine expectations by backward induction. 7 
 
The government supports expansionary policies to contrast the output gap or expected inflation and 
reacts to monetary policy by reducing the fiscal stance. The intuition is straightforward. If the 
economy is stabilized by the monetary authority, the government is more likely to be inactive, 
whereas greater distortions call for sharper fiscal activism. The central bank has a similar, but 
symmetric, behavior. Note that higher inflation expectations and wider gaps between natural and 
desired output ( yy
∗ − ) call for more aggressive policies.  
Uncertainty makes the central bank reaction function flatter, meaning that the monetary authority is 
more cautious in reacting to the other variables and, therefore, in stabilizing the economy as result 
of Brainard’s conservatism principle. By contrast, the reaction of the government does not depend 
on 
2
ε σ  as it is not affected by uncertainty.  
By applying rational expectations to equations (8) and (9) and solving them, we obtain the 
following Nash equilibrium  
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 (11) 
By using (10) and (11) into (2) and (3) we obtain the expected (or average) equilibrium values for 
output and inflation expressed as gaps from desired values (the superscript N  denotes the Nash 
equilibrium): 
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 (13) 
Equations (12) and (13) emphasize the biases emerging from multiplicative uncertainty.
19 In D&L 
(2003a) they are both zero. Moreover, differently from D&L (2003a), the monetary regimes matter 
as they determine the sign of the biases. In the deflationary regime, monetary policy is not 
restrictive enough; a positive inflation bias and a negative output gap will thus be observed. Output 
is lower than the desired one as the cost of using the fiscal instrument is high because the central 
bank does not accommodate fiscal expansions. In the inflationary regime, the central bank 
continues not to accommodate fiscal expansions, but now through expansionary policies. Yet, 
monetary policy is not expansionary enough: a negative inflation bias and a positive output gap will 
then be observed.  
We can summarize our main results in three propositions.  
Proposition 1. Under multiplicative uncertainty, the symbiosis assumption no longer guarantees the 
achievement of ideal output and inflation when policy-makers attempt to achieve a level of output 
which is higher than the natural one, or target an inflation different from zero.  
Proof. See equations (12) and (13).    
                                                 
19 It is worth noticing that the nature of these biases may change according to the transmission mechanisms of fiscal 
policy which is considered (i.e. the sign of a  and c ). They never however disappear. 8 
 
The result stemming from the above proposition derives from a coordination problem related to 
multiplicative uncertainty and the conflict between the policymakers that it implies. In the full 
information case, in fact, the common targets are always obtained (even if a cooperative solution is 
not considered) and there are no coordination problems. This occurs since there exists only one 
combination of policies that leads to those shared targets. By contrast, when we consider 
multiplicative uncertainty, outcomes are random and a conflict among policymakers emerges. 
Average outcomes are optimal for the fiscal authority that does not perceive any uncertainty, but 
they are suboptimal for the central bank as the costs of deviating from the optimal policy under 
certainty are now asymmetric. Thus achieving the common targets on average is no longer a 
common objective for the policymakers and a contrast among them arises. The conflict also implies 
that the Nash equilibrium is no longer efficient and coordination among policy-makers is needed.  
Our result is rather general since it is robust with respect to different shock structures and to the 
order of moves (i.e., game timing).
20 In particular, the symbiosis assumption is not sufficient to 
guarantee the achievement of ideal outcomes for all the possible forms of multiplicative uncertainty 
(irrespectively of parameter signs). The only exception is a shock on the semi-elasticity of the 
inflation surprise term (i.e., a shock on parameter b  in equation (2)). In fact, even if policymakers 
observe all the shocks, they are not able to use inflation surprise in order to affect the average 
outcomes (in equilibrium expected inflation surprise is always zero as this policy is always 
anticipated by the private sector). Thus, if policymakers are able to achieve the common ideal 
outcomes in the D&L (2003)’s information set, they must be able to do so also if the effects of 
inflation surprise are subject to uncertainty. In other words, this shock does not prevent the 
policymakers’ common ideal outcomes from being achieved on average as inflation surprise is not 
used to this aim.  
Our results related to the monetary regimes and the monetary stance are summarized in the 
following proposition.  
Proposition 2. Uncertainty leads to more (or less) expansionary monetary policies depending on the 
monetary regime that emerges under the perfect information (or the certainty equivalent) case. More 
in details, in the deflationary (inflationary) regime where  expansionary fiscal policy must be 
supported by a restrictive (expansionary) monetary one, optimal monetary policy under 
multiplicative uncertainty is more (less) expansionary than in the certainty equivalent case.    
Proof. Differentiate equation (11) with respect to 
2
ε σ .    
This result is apparently surprising as it is expected that multiplicative uncertainty should always 
lead to less aggressive policies. However, the result is just an application of Brainard’s 
conservatism principle. In fact, if the inflation target is high ( ( )
c
a yy π
∗∗ >− ), optimal monetary 
policy leads to the standard Barro & Gordon’s inflationary equilibrium under perfect information. 
Therefore, uncertainty leads to the expected results of lower inflation by mitigating the 




* * π , the full information equilibrium 
implies deflation. As a consequence, Brainard’s conservative principle calls for more expansionary 
policy (i.e., less deflationary). Results are thus not surprising at all.  
Proposition 2 stresses that the effects of multiplicative uncertainty on the policymakers’ objectives 
depend not only on the sources of uncertainty, but also on the existing kind of interactions among 
them (i.e., the policy regime). In other words, in a single decision maker context, model 
parameterization only accounts for the strength, but not for the sign, of Brainard’s moderation 
                                                 
20 For the sake of brevity, here robustness is only discussed in informal terms. Further analytical results are available 
upon request from the authors. 9 
 
effect; in policy games it determines also the direction of such moderation as the “signs” of policies 
are endogenous and depend on the policy regime. This result qualifies the role of uncertainty in the 
debate on the subject matter.  
Regarding the robustness of this result, differently from Proposition 1, our statement applies only to 
monetary policy uncertainty. In fact, as showed in Di Bartolomeo et al. (2009), in the same context, 
multiplicative uncertainty on fiscal policy always leads to policy attenuation in the use of the fiscal 
instrument and to more expansionary monetary policy.  
Finally, regarding policy implications, uncertainty induces an equilibrium relationship between the 
objective variables which is described by the following proposition.  
Proposition 3. Multiplicative uncertainty implies an endogenous relationship between the objective 
variables that resembles a Phillips curve menu, i.e. an increase in policy-makers’ desired output 
raises both output and inflation – and vice versa.  











∂ .    
The above proposition asks for a qualification. In the realm of policy games, policies cannot be 
examined ex ante as they are endogenously determined from players’ preferences, information sets 
and interactions (i.e., model constraints);
21 thus a Phillips menu cannot be explicitly defined. It can 
be however described in terms of changes in policymakers’ preferences. Thus, we refer to a Phillips 
menu as the fact that coeteris paribus an increase in the common output target implies that output 
rises in equilibrium, as desired by the policymakers, but inflation increases too. The same can be 
said by considering a change in the common inflation target; e.g., to reduce the inflation target after 
an exogenous change in their preferences, policymakers must accept a cost in terms of output 
reduction.  
The Phillips relationship derives from the fact that multiplicative uncertainty implies deviations 
from full-information optimal monetary policy which in turn depends on desired inflation and 
output. This relationship is peculiar of monetary policy uncertainty as it does not emerge in the case 
of fiscal policy. Multiplicative uncertainty on fiscal policy implies that expected output is given by 
a weighted average of  y
∗ and  y , but it is not related to π
∗. This occurs because, differently from 
monetary policy, under full information optimal fiscal policy does not depends on π
∗ (see Di 
Bartolomeo et al., 2009).  
4. Conclusions 
This paper has extended a well-known model of fiscal-monetary interactions to the case in which 
policymakers face uncertainty on the effects of their policies. A more general stochastic structure 
than the additive one implies that uncertainty may be no longer neutral (for average outcomes) and 
may lead to different results and policy implications from those stemming in the certain equivalence 
case.  
Summarizing, our main findings are as follows. The D&L’s symbiosis result no longer holds under 
unknown multiplicative shocks on monetary policy effects. Monetary uncertainty and fiscal 
uncertainty are not symmetric, as only the former may induce both more and less aggressive effects 
on the final outcomes according to the kind of existing interaction between the government and the 
central bank.
22 Finally, multiplicative uncertainty implies an endogenous Phillips relationship 
                                                 
21 See, for a discussion, Acocella and Di Bartolomeo (2004). 
22 In the same context, fiscal uncertainty always implies more conservative fiscal policy and more expansionary 10 
 
between inflation and output which does not emerge under fiscal uncertainty.  
Two different regimes can emerge which imply different outcomes and properties. Our result can 
thus potentially explain the conflicting empirical evidence on the sign and magnitude of the effects 
of inflation uncertainty and economic activity.
23 Given the relevance of central bank’s time-varying 
inflation targets to explain economic dynamics stressed by recent studies,
24 we emphasis that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy under uncertainty may be related to the time varying targeting 
policy and the fiscal stance, and that empirical evidence should take account of these factors in 
order to fully understand the real effect of inflation uncertainty.   
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